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Abstract – Pollen-mediated gene flow is one of the 
main concerns associated with the introduction of 
genetically modified (GM) crops, since growers of GM 
varieties normally do not take into account its possible 
impact on conventional and organic growers therefore 
generating negative externalities. Should a premium 
for non-GM varieties emerge on the market, 
'contamination' with GM pollen would generate a 
revenue loss for growers of non-GM varieties. The 
existence of such externalities has led the European 
Union (EU) to put forward the concept of coexistence 
in order to guarantee farmers' freedom to plant both 
conventional and GM varieties without generating 
economic losses to conventional farmers. The first 
part of this paper develops a simple economic model 
analysing the problem of pollen-mediated gene flow as 
a particular kind of production externality. The 
model, although simple, provides useful insights into 
the policy needed to regulate coexistence. 
Since pollen-mediated gene flow is distance-
dependent, the externalities will depend on the spatial 
structure of GM adoption in the landscape. The 
second part of the paper, taking GM herbicide 
tolerant oilseed rape (Brassica napus) as a model crop, 
uses a Monte Carlo experiment to generate data and 
then estimate the effect of some important policy 
variables (i.e. number of GM and conventional fields 
in the landscape, width of buffer zones and spatial 
aggregation) on the magnitude of the externality 
associated with pollen-mediated gene flow. Our results 
show that buffer areas on conventional fields are more 
effective than those on GM fields and that the degree 
of spatial aggregation exerts the largest marginal 
effect on the externality to conventional growers. The 
implications of the results for the coexistence policies 
in the EU are then discussed. 
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The coexistence of genetically modified (GM) 
and conventional crops in the EU is admitted under 
the principle that farmers should be able to cultivate 
freely the crops they choose, be it GM crops, 
conventional or organic crops. However, this is 
qualified by the need to account for any economic 
consequences of adventitious presence of material 
from one crop to another [1]. In principle, the 
environmental aspects of the introduction of GM 
crops are addressed before authorisation for their 
release is granted (EC Directive 18/2001). The 
economic consequences of GM crop introductions 
are not. So the problem is to identify ex ante 
measures that will deal with the efficiency issues 
raised by GM crops. There are two issues involved.  
One relates to the ability of GM material to mix with 
conventional material through pollen and seed 
dispersal, and so physically to contaminate 
conventional crops [2].  The other relates to the 
attitudes of consumers to GM crops (i.e. their 
willingness to pay a premium for conventional 
products), and so to the cost of GM contamination 
of conventional crops. Since the negative 
consequences of the introduction of GM crops on 
conventional crops are not taken into account in 
market transactions between GM and conventional 
producers, they indicate the existence of a 
production externality. Since the level of 
contamination is distance-dependent (i.e. 
conventional plots closer to GM plots will show 
higher levels of contamination) spatial 
considerations are important. 
There already exist mechanisms to detect the 
existence of contamination – i.e. the physical 
evidence for this externality. In 2003 the EU 
adopted two Regulations (EC Regulation 1829/2003 
and 1830/2003) establishing a 0.9% threshold for 
the maximum adventitious presence (AP) of GM 
material in conventional food and feed, and setting 
up the principles of traceability of GM material 
along the production chain. However, there do not 
yet exist mechanisms to internalise the damages 
associated with contamination.    
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In this paper we consider this problem in relation 
to one of the GM crops that is currently under 
consideration in the EU: herbicide tolerant oilseed 
rape (simply GM OSR from now on). GM OSR is 
already extensively grown in Canada (as canola) and 
elsewhere because of its greater flexibility in weed 
management [3]. There is evidence of GM OSR 
contamination of neighbouring and successive 
conventional crops in those countries [2] and that 
this contamination has economic consequences (e.g. 
the virtual cessation of organic canola farming in 
Saskatchewan, Canada, as reported in [4]). In other 
words, there is evidence that the introduction of GM 
OSR outside of the EU has involved spatial 
production externalities.  We consider how such 
externalities might be addressed if GM OSR is 
admitted in the EU. Economic analysis of 
coexistence is limited. So for example [5] illustrates 
how under mandatory labelling the introduction of 
GM crops in the EU might be welfare reducing. [6] 
illustrate how the evolving coexistence regulations 
in the EU might reduce the appeal of growing GM 
varieties. Our objective is first, to develop an 
analytical model capable of framing the efficiency 
issues raised by the coexistence of GM and 
conventional crops in the landscape. Second, we 
wish to use the available information about pollen-
mediated gene flow and carry out a Monte Carlo 
experiment to characterise the relationship between 
the magnitude of the externality at the landscape 
level and a number of important 'policy variables' 
(namely the area of GM and conventional OSR in 
the landscape, the width of buffers on GM and 
conventional fields and the degree of spatial 
aggregation). This information can be very useful in 
order to discuss the different policy options for 
coexistence.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 
two presents the analytical model to describe the 
coexistence problem on the basis of a production 
externality framework. Section three illustrates the 
Monte Carlo simulation used to generate data on 
pollen-mediated gene flow, starting from an 
individual OSR plant dispersal function (IDF). 
Section four uses the generated data to fit a 
functional form for the pollen-mediated gene flow 
externality. The last session discusses the main 
results and draws some conclusions. 
 
II. THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
 
The problem we wish to address is the 
internalisation of spatial externalities whose 
characteristics depend on the pattern of adoption of 
GM technology. All fields are of identical size, but 
the effect of the GM trait and hence the incentive to 
adopt GM technology differs between farms and is 
affected by the regulatory system. In particular, the 
stricter the regulatory system, the lower will be the 
number of farmers adopting GM varieties. Hence a 
number of farmers (i.e. the GM adopters) will 
allocate their land between the GM variety and an 
alternative crop (e.g. winter wheat), while other 
farmers (i.e. the non-adopters) will allocate their 
land between conventional OSR varieties and the 
alternative crop. Denote with Lg the arable land 
available to those farmers who adopt GM and with 
g c L L L − = the area available to the ‘non-adopters’ 
(where  L  denotes the total arable land). We 
suppose that regulation of coexistence takes place 
before the new technology is introduced and in order 
to capture the effect of the regulatory system on the 
appeal of the GM technology we hypothesize two 
different scenarios: 
 
•  The 'unregulated' scenario: coexistence is not 
explicitly regulated. This is the system 
currently in practice in North America. In this 
case the number of adopters will be relatively 
large and the land available to adopters and 
non-adopters will be respectively 
U




c L L L − = . 
•  The 'regulated' scenario: the regulator 
announces that coexistence will be regulated 
through the introduction of a moderate levy/tax 
on GM OSR land allocation, a moderate 
(mandatory) buffer on the edge of those GM 
fields adjacent to conventional fields and some 
incentives to pursue the clustering of GM and 
conventional OSR fields away from each other 
in order to maximise joint GM and 
conventional growers profits. In this case the 
number of adopters will be lower, and the 
arable land available to adopters and non-










c L L L L > − = . 
 
We assume that adoption of GM varieties is 
irreversible and we exclude the possibility that  
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farmers grow both GM and conventional varieties of 
the same crop. In the case of GM OSR these are 
plausible assumptions since OSR seeds persist in the 
seedbank for many years making cultivation of 
conventional OSR in those fields difficult [7]. The 
analysis is static and confined to the farm level and 
only addresses the problem of coexistence between 
GM and conventional OSR varieties, therefore 
excluding organic OSR (organic OSR production is 
extremely limited in the EU). We do not include the 
costs of herbicide resistance development, through 
gene flow or volunteers' dispersal, in the analysis 
since they have been shown to be quite low 
elsewhere (around C$ 2 per acre in Canada, [8].  
Consumer preferences for conventional produce 
imply that the price of conventional crops (pc) is 
higher than the price of the GM crop (pg) (e.g. [9]). 
The price of the other crop is (pa). Farmers cannot 
influence these prices by their actions. Technology 
is represented through standard (i.e. concave) 
production functions denoted as fg(•), fc(•) and fa(•) 
for GM OSR, conventional OSR and the alternative 
crop respectively. Please note that the purpose of the 
analytical model is to frame the problem of 
coexistence in terms of production externalities. As 
such sufficient conditions for optimality are not 
discussed here, although it can be shown that with 
appropriate restrictions on the functional forms they 
will be satisfied. 
The physical basis of the externality is assumed 
to be cross pollination. Pollen from GM varieties 
contaminates conventional varieties within some 
distance. Other sources of contamination (e.g. 
adventitious presence in seeds) are excluded for 
simplicity. When contamination at field level 
exceeds a certain threshold (0.9% in our case) the 
product must be labelled as containing GM and will 
be sold at the lower price pg. Let E denote the 
contamination cost to the conventional farmers. 
Since pollen-mediated gene flow is distance-
dependent contamination can be reduced through the 
adoption of buffer areas on adjacent conventional 
and/or GM fields and/or by increasing clustering 
[10]. 
 
A. The 'unregulated' approach 
 
The first case we wish to address refers to a 
situation in which coexistence is not formally 
regulated. This is essentially what happens in North 
America. In this case GM farmers have no incentive 
to set up any buffer or to cluster GM fields away 
from conventional fields to mitigate contamination 
of neighbouring conventional farmers. Let dg denote 
the width of the buffer on GM fields and eg denote 
the 'coordination effort' of GM farmers necessary to 
increase clustering. In this case it is obvious that 
GM farmers will set dg=0 and eg=0 and their 
problem can be represented as follows 
 
( ) ( ) ag a ag a a g g g g g
l l




    (1.a) 
Subject to 
U
g ag g L l l = +                 (1.b) 
 
GM farmers maximize profits through the choice 
of land allocation to the GM OSR lg and to the 
alternative crop lag, given a fixed amount of land 
available Lg
U, the technology, output prices pg and pa 
and variable costs cg and ca. Land is the only 
argument of the production functions (i.e. all other 
inputs are applied in fixed proportions).  
The first order necessary conditions (FONC) 














p − = −                  (1.c) 
 
From (1.c), GM farmers will increase the area 
committed to GM crops up to the point where the 
marginal returns on GM OSR and the alternative 
crop are equalized. GM farmers will in general 
ignore any impact on conventional farmers. If the 
external effect of cross-pollination is negative, the 
area allocated to GM OSR will be too large from the 
social point of view.  
The problem for the conventional farmers can be 
represented as follows 
 
( ) ()
() ( ) • − − − +
• − −
E we l c l f p
ha l c l f p
c ac a ac a a
c c c c c c
e d l lMax
c c ac c
ˆ ˆ





c ac c L L L l l − = = +               (2.b) 
 
With  c c c a l l − = ˆ . Conventional farmers maximize 
profits through the choice of land allocation to 
conventional OSR lc, the alternative (to conventional 
OSR) crop lac and buffer width dc on conventional 
OSR fields adjacent to GM OSR fields so as to 
create a buffer area ac, the coordination effort ec to  
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cluster conventional fields away from GM fields, 
given a fixed amount of land Lc
U, technology, output 
prices pc and pa, variable production costs cc and ca, 
buffer area maintenance costs h and coordination 
effort costs w. The magnitude of the buffer area ac 
depends on the area allocated to conventional OSR 
(the larger lc the larger the buffer area ac) and GM 
OSR (the larger lg the larger the likelihood of a GM 
and conventional OSR field being adjacent), on the 
buffer width dc eventually adopted and on the level 
of spatial aggregation (the more clustered the 
configuration the smaller the buffer area). Define a 
generic index of spatial aggregation (A) such 
that 1 0 ≤ ≤ A  (where the value 0 reflects a 
completely disaggregated configuration and the 
value 1 a completely aggregated one). From 
percolation theory [11] we know that for lc=lg=0 A 
will be identically equal to 1, since if no OSR 
(conventional and GM) is grown the whole 
landscape will be planted with the alternative crop 
and the configuration of the landscape will be totally 
aggregated. If we exclude such a trivial case, then A 
will be an increasing function of GM and 
conventional farmers' coordination efforts eg and ec. 
The conventional farmers' buffer area can then be 
expressed as  ( ) ( ) c g c g c c c e e A d l l a a , , , , = . The 
magnitude of the buffer area will be zero if no GM 
OSR or no conventional OSR are grown and if the 
buffer width is zero.   
The term E in (2.a) represents the externality due 
to pollen-mediated gene flow and reflects the 
premium  ∆p = pc-pg lost on the contaminated 
conventional OSR production C. The literature on 
pollen-mediated gene flow suggests that for given 
premium, the externality will be increasing in the 
magnitude of the GM and conventional OSR area, 
decreasing in buffer width and decreasing in the 
level of spatial aggregation [12]. Then we can write 
 
( ) ( )
() () c g c g
c g c g c g
d d A l l C p
d d e e A l l E E
, , , ,
, , , , ,
• × ∆ =
=
                    (2.c) 
 


















































  (2.e) 
Where CL in (2.d) reflects the conventional OSR 
area (net of the buffer) with AP levels above the 
0.9% threshold.  
In general the greater the magnitude of the source 
population in a landscape (compared to the sink 
population), the higher will be the degree of 
outcrossing observed in the sink population (e.g. 
[13] and [14]). In our case, this implies that the 
higher the GM area in the landscape, the higher will 
be the level of AP in conventional fields. It is then 
reasonable to expect that C will increase when the 
GM area in the landscape increases (first inequality 
in 2.e). On the other hand the level of outcrossing is 
higher when source and sink populations are 
scattered in the landscape (i.e. disaggregated) 
compared to situations in which source and sink 
populations are 'aggregated' in different parts of the 
landscape (e.g. [15], [12] and [16]). It is then 
reasonable to expect that increasing spatial 
aggregation of GM and/or conventional fields in the 
landscape (i.e. clustering) will reduce the magnitude 
of C (second inequality in 2.e). Finally, since pollen-
mediated gene flow is distance-dependent (e.g. [17] 
and [18]), it is reasonable to expect that C will 
decrease if the width of buffer areas on both GM 
and conventional fields increases (third and fourth 
inequalities in 2.e). The inequalities in (2.e) can be 
interpreted as hypotheses and will be tested 
empirically in section 4. Note that in (2.e) we do not 
specify the partial derivative  c l E ∂ ∂  since a-priori 
its sign is ambiguous. On one hand an increase in 
the conventional crop area is likely to 'dilute' the AP 
level (i.e. 'dilution effect'): since an increase in the 
size of the receiving population (relative to the 
magnitude of the donor population) will lead to an 
increase in the targets for the pollen and to a 
reduction in the average rate of fertilisation from 
foreign pollen sources [14], the AP level in each 
conventional field will be lower the larger the area 
planted with conventional crops. This would suggest 
a negative sign for the partial derivative. On the 
other hand an increase in the conventional OSR area 
will increase the conventional output susceptible of 
having AP levels above 0.9% (i.e. 'production 
effect'): even if AP level in each field is likely to be 
lower, the number of fields with AP above 0.9% 
might increase when the number of conventional 
fields increases. This would suggest a positive sign 
for the partial derivative. Therefore we delay the 
discussion of the sign of this partial derivative to the 
empirical analysis in section 4.  
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c c     (2.h) 
 
From (2.f) conventional farmers will increase the 
land area committed to conventional OSR so as to 
equate marginal returns on alternative crops, taking 
into account the cost of buffers (i.e. the second term 
on the l.h.s. of 2.f) and the contamination cost (the 
third term on the l.h.s. of 2.f). From (2.g) 
conventional farmers will increase defensive buffer 
widths up to the point where the marginal external 
damage saved (i.e. the last term on the l.h.s. of 2.g) 
is equal to the marginal net benefit of crop 
production forgone (i.e. the first term on the l.h.s. of 
2.g). From (2.h), conventional farmers will invest in 
coordination of planting decisions to cluster the 
conventional OSR fields, up to the point where the 
marginal benefits of the reduction in the magnitude 
of the buffer required (i.e. the first element on the 
l.h.s. of 2.h) and the reduction in the contamination 
cost (i.e. the second element on the l.h.s. of 2.h) will 
equate the marginal cost w. This is in line with 
empirical evidence suggesting that the recipients of 
an externality tend to cluster away from the 
generators [19]. 
 
B. The 'regulated' approach 
 
The inefficiency associated with the externality 
E originates from GM growers' decisions about 
planting 'excessive' GM OSR, by their reluctance to 
adopt 'appropriate' separation distances to create 
buffer areas and to invest in 'appropriate' levels of 
coordination to increase clustering. The adjectives 
'excessive' and 'appropriate' refer to the existence of 
a 'social optimum' in which the joint profits of GM 
adopters and non-adopters are maximised. The 
social optimum presupposes some form of 
regulation but it does not require the total 
elimination of the externality. In these 
circumstances it is reasonable to assume that the 
number of GM adopters will be lower than in the 
unregulated case. For the purpose of the analysis 
define GM farmers' buffers as 
( ) ( ) c g g c g g g e e A d l l a a , , , , = , with similar 
properties as the already defined conventional 
farmers' buffers ac.  Then the social optimum can be 




() E we l c l f p ha
l c l f p we l c l f p
ha l c l f p
c ac a ac a a c
c c c c c g ag a ag a a
g g g g g g
e e d d l l l l Max
c g c g ac c ag g
− − − + −
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c ac c L L L l l − = = +  (3.b) 
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   (3.h) 
 
It is interesting to compare (3.c, 3.d, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g 
and 3.h) with (1.c) and (2.f, 2.g and 2.h). From (3.d) 
GM farmers will invest in buffers up to the point 
where its marginal costs (i.e. the first term on the 
l.h.s. of 3.d) equals the social marginal benefits 
associated with the reduction in the contamination 
cost E (i.e. the second term on the l.h.s. of 3.d). This 
is in sharp contrast with the situation encountered in 
the 'unregulated' approach, where GM farmers set 
dg=0. Since in the regulated case GM farmers might 
be required to adopt a buffer (i.e. dg>0), expression 
(3.e) implies that their socially optimal investment 
in coordination effort should be determined so as to 
balance its marginal cost w with its marginal 
benefits in terms of a) reduction of GM farmers 
buffer through increased aggregation (i.e. the first 
term on the l.h.s. of 3.e), b) reduction of 
conventional farmers buffers through increased 
aggregation (i.e. the second term on the l.h.s. of 3.e) 
and c) reduction in the contamination cost (i.e. the 
third term on the l.h.s. of 3.e). When GM buffers are 
adopted, GM farmers land allocation decisions will 
also be different from the 'unregulated' case (as in 
1.c). From (3.c) GM farmers will increase the GM 
OSR area up to the point where marginal returns on 
alternative land uses, taking into account the cost of 
their own buffer (i.e. the second term on the l.h.s. of 
3.c), the marginal effects on conventional farmers 
through the cost of contamination (i.e. the fourth 
term on the l.h.s. of 3.c) and the cost of the 
conventional buffer area (i.e. the third term on the 
l.h.s. of 3.c), are equalized. This suggests that the 
presence of GM OSR affects conventional farmers 
in two ways: a) by imposing some degree of 
contamination and b) by affecting the magnitude of 
the conventional buffers (since the buffer must be 
applied on all the edges of conventional fields 
adjacent to GM fields). From (3.f) conventional 
farmers will increase conventional OSR area up to 
the point where marginal returns on alternative land 
uses taking into account also the effects on GM 
farmers buffer area (i.e. the last term on the l.h.s. of 
3.f) are equalized. By comparing expression (3.f) 
with (2.f) it is evident how when GM buffers are 
applied,  conventional farmers land allocation 
decisions have also an effect on GM farmers. As 
such at the social optimum this external effect must 
be accounted for.  Expression (3.g) is identical to 
(2.g). Finally, expression (3.h) suggests that for 
conventional farmers the socially optimal level of 
coordination effort should be determined by 
balancing its marginal cost w with its marginal 
benefits in terms of a) reduction in conventional 
farmers buffers (i.e. the first term on the l.h.s. of 
3.h), b) reduction in GM farmers buffers (i.e. the 
second term on the l.h.s. of 3.h) and reduction of the 
contamination cost (i.e. the third term on the l.h.s. of 
3.h). By comparing (3.h) with (2.h) it appears that in 
the unregulated regime also conventional farmers 
will not invest enough in coordination effort, since 
they will ignore the benefits occurring to GM 
farmers from increased aggregation. 
Denote the solution to (3.a, 3.b) 
as ( )
* * * * * * * * , , , , , , , c g c g ac c ag g e e d d l l l l SO ≡ . The 
corrective mechanism to achieve the social optimum 
could include a mandatory buffer on GM fields 
adjacent to conventional fields consistent with joint 
profit maximization 
*
g d , a tax 
*
g τ  on the GM OSR 
land allocation (accounting for the crop 
contamination externality and for the effect on 
conventional growers buffer area) and a tax 
*
c τ  on 
conventional OSR land allocation (accounting for 
the effect on GM growers buffer area) and some 
mechanism (e.g. a penalty) to incentivate both GM 
and conventional farmers to invest the appropriate 
resources in coordination effort. It is very likely that 
* *
c g τ τ > and if the effect of land al location 
decisions of one category of farmers on the 
magnitude of the buffer areas of the other category 
is relatively small (i.e.  0 ≅ ∂ ∂ g c l a and 
0 ≅ ∂ ∂ c g l a ), then  g g l E ∂ ∂ ≅
* τ  and  0
* ≅ c τ . 
It is perhaps worth mentioning how another 
solution could be to require GM farmers to adopt 
buffers wide enough to ensure that no contamination 
at all occurs on any conventional fields (i.e. total 
elimination of the externality). Without going into 
the details, it can be shown that this approach is 
likely to be inefficient for different reasons. First, it  
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might require GM farmers to adopt buffer areas 
larger than socially optimal. This in turn will 
discourage the planting of GM varieties, beyond 
what it would be socially desirable. Also, 
conventional farmers have no incentives to self 
protect so they will plant an excessive area of 
conventional OSR, they will introduce no buffers 
and they will not invest in coordination effort to 
increase aggregation.  
 
III. THE MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
 
The analytical model presented in section 2 
provides a schematic way to illustrate how the 
problem of coexistence clearly falls within the remit 
of production externalities. However, it is very 
difficult to make any detailed prescription on 
coexistence policies (apart from the general ones 
derived above) when little information about the 
nature of the GM externality exists. Our objective in 
the rest of the paper is to characterise the function 
describing the contamination externality, with 
particular attention to the effect of the different 
decision variables (i.e. land allocation decisions, 
buffer width and degree of spatial aggregation). We 
will refer to such decision variables as 'policy 
variables', since any policy to regulate coexistence 
(e.g. tax on GM land allocation, mandatory buffers, 
incentives to increase aggregation) will ultimately 
act on them.  
The large body of research on pollination biology 
has established that pollen concentration decreases 
rapidly within a few metres from the source but low 
levels can be detected at longer distances.  This can 
be represented by a leptokurtic curve (e.g. [18]). 
Starting from an IDF, it is possible to use Monte 
Carlo simulations in order to characterise the 
functional form of the externality (expressions 2.c) 
and derive some insights into possible regulatory 
policies. 
The model employed here is relatively simple, 
since it does not take into account important factors 
like flower synchrony, seed survival, emergence 
patterns etc., but it rather focuses on some of the 
variables that are expressly being targeted by the 
evolving coexistence regulations in the EU (i.e. the 
'policy variables'). [20], for example, rely on the 
GENESYS model ([21] and [22]) to make accurate 
assessments of gene flow in OSR under 'real' 
agricultural conditions. By focusing on a more 
limited number of variables we are able to provide 
stylised results on the effectiveness of different 
instruments to minimise the externality at the 
landscape level. Also, the approach developed here 
could be integrated into more complex models.  
In this paper we start from the model developed 
in [24] and extend it to account for the effect of 
buffer areas on conventional and GM fields. Given 
the similarities between the two approaches, we only 
provide a brief description here and refer the reader 
to the more complete exposition presented in [23] 
and [24]. A 100 ha landscape, consisting of a 1000 × 
1000 two-dimensional grid of cells, each measuring 
1m
2, is defined. The crop landscape can then be 
modelled as consisting of plants placed at the centre 
of each of these cells. This grid of cells is divided 
conceptually into 100 identical 1 ha fields. This field 
size was chosen because of computational 
constraints and given the variability in field sizes 
across the EU it is difficult to identify typical field 
sizes. Since the purpose of the analysis is not to 
make exact predictions but rather to provide stylized 
results, the limitations to the analysis imposed by 
small field size is not necessarily a problem. 
Assume that a proportion lg of the 100 fields 
consists of GM OSR, a proportion lc consists of 
conventional OSR while the remaining 100 – lg – lc 
fields consist of another crop (e.g. winter wheat, 
barley etc). Also assume that when a GM OSR and a 
conventional field are adjacent to each other buffer 
areas of width dg and dc are applied on the bordering 
sides of the fields. In this experiment both the GM 
and conventional buffers are assumed to be left 
bare
1.  In order to calculate the level of GM cross-
pollination in each conventional field an average 
IDF, as estimated by [18], is used. Different IDF for 
OSR have been estimated (e.g. [25] and [17]). Each 
one would generate slightly different results, but 
given the preliminary nature of our analysis we 
believe that starting from [18] is appropriate. Using 
this pollen dispersal function for OSR 54.65% of the 
pollen produced in a cell falls on the square itself, 
while the remaining 45.35% disperses according to 
the negative exponential function 






125 . 0 − = e K g  (where δ is the radial 
distance from the source and K is a constant to 
ensure the integral of the function is unity). From 
                                                 
1 An extension of the model could consider the effect of 
having conventional buffers planted with OSR which 
could be subsequently sold as GM.  
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this function, for each non-GM cell, we calculate the 
proportion of pollen received that is GM. In addition 
to pollen flow, the ovules targeted are important. 
OSR is partially self-fertilised: only a proportion of 
the ovules of each plant will be fertilised by foreign 
pollen. In the experiments carried out by [18], the 
selfing rate was found to be 0.589 ± 0.065.  As no 
information was reported as to the shape of this 
distribution, the model assumes a uniform 
distribution for simplicity. GM AP levels at the 
scale of fields, as the average of the AP level of each 
cell in that field
2 can then be obtained.  
During the simulation the area of conventional 
crop (net of the buffer) corresponding to those fields 
with AP levels above the 0.9% threshold, CL, was 
recorded. In order to compute C the production 
function fc(•) is needed (as in 2.d). To specify this 
function we draw on UK data on OSR production 
and area over the period 1984-2003 and fit a Cobb-
Douglas form. The value of the scale parameter is 
adjusted in order to account for the difference 
between the magnitude of our simulation 
environment (100 ha) and UK acreage of winter 
OSR (200,000 – 500,000 ha). On the basis of the 
estimated relationship we set 
() ()
9 . 0 3 CL CL f C c = = .  
The main purpose of the simulation is to generate 
data in order to estimate expressions (2.c) and to test 
(2.e). Notice that for given premium ∆p, the 
externality E is entirely defined by the 'contaminated 
output' C (see expression 2.c). Therefore our effort 
will be concentrated on estimating C. To ensure 
enough variability in the data generation process and 
better estimate their effect on C, in each run of the 
simulation we assume that the 'policy variables' are 
drawn from independent uniform distribution as 
follows:  () 52 , 13 ~U lg ,  ( ) 48 , 12 ~U lc , 
() 10 , 0 ~U d g  and  ( ) 10 , 0 ~U dc . The maximum 
width of the buffer areas was set at 10 metres, given 
the relatively small size of the fields (1 ha). Starting 
from an IDF function allows us to account not only 
for the effect of GM OSR area, conventional OSR 
area and buffers, but also to assess the effect of 
spatial aggregation of GM and conventional fields in 
the landscape C. In each simulation run the position 
of the GM and conventional fields in the landscape 
was randomly assigned. In reality it is reasonable to 
                                                 
2 In doing so, the cells that belong to the buffer areas are 
not considered. 
believe that fields with similar crops are not located 
randomly in the landscape [26]. In particular, the 
presence of the externality might induce the 
recipient of the externality (the conventional farmers 
in our case) to cluster away from the generators (the 
GM fields in our case) [19]. However, assuming 
random field locations is necessary in the Monte 
Carlo experiment in order to obtain sufficient 
variability in the aggregation variable A to better 
estimate its effects on C. Once C has been 
estimated, it is still possible to infer the implications 
of changes of the relevant variables (e.g. crop areas, 
buffer areas) for different levels of spatial 
aggregation. The level of spatial aggregation is 







i i A A
1
α                     (4.a) 
 
i i i i i A , , max_ε ε =                    (4.b) 
 
Where A: Aggregation index for the landscape; Ai: 
Aggregation index for the i-th class; εi,i: total 
number of edges shared by the i-th class; max_εi,i: 
maximum (possible) number of edges shared by the 
i-th class; αi: % of the landscape occupied by the i-th 
class; n: total number of classes. Remember that the 
aggregation index is a number between 0 and 1 and 
is equal to 0 (is equal to 1) when the configuration is 




Through repeated simulations (3000 runs) we 
generate data in order to estimate (2.c) and test (2.e). 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the main 
data recorded during the simulation, while Figure 1 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the variables in the 
simulation 
 
Variables Description   
(Unit) 
Mean S.D. Min. Max. # 
Cases 
lg  # of 1ha GM 
fields  
(# and/or ha) 
32.5 11.5  13  52  3000 
lc  # of 1ha conv. 
fields  
(# and/or ha) 
29.9 10.7  12  48  3000 
dg  Buffer width 
on GM fields  
(m.) 
4.9 3.1  0  10 3000 




5.1 3.2  0  10 3000 
A Aggregation 
index 
0.4 0.06 0.25  0.66  3000 












Figure 1 Pollen-mediated AP levels in conventional fields 
at 1m
2 level (top left panel) and averaged within a field 
(top right panel). The bottom left panel illustrates an 
enlargement of the top left panel, while the colour scale 




A. The contaminated output C 
 
The data generated through the simulation are 
used to fit the following functional form for C in 
(2.c) 
 
( ) ( ) ()




+ + + +
+ + =
5 4 3
2 1 0 log log log
β β β
β β β
            (5.a) 
 
Given the use of logarithm transformation, 
observations in which C=0 have been dropped from 
the sample.  
Expression (5.a) is estimated through Generalised 
Least Squares (GLS), in order to correct for the 
detected heteroskedasticity in the error terms u [28]. 
The correct specification hypothesis is tested 
through the RESET test [28] and cannot be rejected 
at the 0.1% significance level. The estimation results 
are reported in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Regression coefficients (and standard errors) 
reflecting the effect of the listed variables on the 
logarithm of the contaminated output log(C). 
 
Variables Coefficients  (β) of expression 
























Estimation of (5.a) yields the predicted value 
( ) C log  and the regression standard error σ . Then 
the predicted value of C can be retrieved as follows 
[29] 
 
( ) () ( ) C C log exp 2 exp
2 σ =                 (5.b) 
 
If information about the premium ∆p exists, the 
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B. Comparative analysis 
 
In order to assess the effect of changes in the 
variables lg, lc, dg, dc and A on C we look at the 
marginal effect (ME). Given a function  () n x x ... 1 ϕ , 
the ME with respect to the k-th variable is defined as 
() k k x ME ∂ • ∂ = ϕ . The ME indicates the change 
in the dependent variable (C in our case) associated 
with small changes in the independent variable 
under consideration (assuming that all other 
dependent variables are constant). Estimating the 
ME for of the different 'policy variables' on C is 
important in order to make some inferences about 
the policies to regulate coexistence, on the basis of 
the arguments developed in section 2. The second 
column in Table 3 illustrates the MEs for C, when 




Table 3 Estimated marginal effects of the listed variables 
on the contaminated output C (from expression 5.b) when 
A is set to the sample mean (second column) and to the 
sample maximum (last column). The standard errors 
reported in the table have been computed using the delta 
method, as illustrated in [28]. 
 

































The analysis of the ME tells us that C is 
increasing in the GM area and is decreasing in the 
width of the buffers (on GM and conventional 
fields) and in the degree of spatial aggregation. This 
confirms the hypothesis in (2.e). Also  0 > ∂ ∂ c l C , 
implying that the 'dilution effect' is dominated by 
the 'production effect'. The MEs analysis suggests 
that the degree of spatial aggregation is the most 
important factor in determining C. Moreover it 
appears that buffer areas on conventional fields are 
                                                 
3 The MEs vary along the function φ(x1…xn). As such 
they must be estimated at a certain 'point'. In table 3 we 
calculate the MEs at the sample mean.  
more effective than buffer areas on GM fields. This 
could be due to the fact that the largest AP 
concentration occurs always on the edges of 
conventional fields (i.e. when such edges are left 
bare because of the buffers, the AP levels within the 
field are significantly lowered and therefore a larger 
proportion of fields will register AP levels below 
0.9% which in turn will greatly reduce the 
magnitude of C). Also when the buffer is applied on 
the conventional fields the conventional output 
susceptible of contamination is reduced. Also notice 
that in our experiment both conventional and GM 
buffers are left bare. It is plausible that if 
conventional buffers were planted with conventional 
OSR (subsequently sold as GM), the effectiveness 
of conventional buffers could be even higher (since 
the OSR on the buffers would produce pollen that 
would compete with the GM pollen). 
Until now we assumed that all variables, 
including A are evaluated at the sample mean. We 
already pointed out how in reality the distribution of 
GM and conventional fields in the landscape might 
be more clustered than what our simulation assumes. 
Then, it is possible to use the estimated relationships 
for C, to understand how the MEs described above 
change when A is increased. To see this we set A at 
its sample maximum value (A=0.663), while 
keeping all the other dependent variables at the 
sample mean. These results are illustrated in lat 
column on the right in Table 3. 
By comparing the last two columns in Table 3, it 
is immediately evident that the relative importance 
of the different variables does not change even 
though all the marginal effects are smaller (i.e. when 
A is higher a change in any dependent variable has a 
smaller impact on C). This suggests that the results 
are quite robust to changes in the level of 





This paper first develops an analytical model to 
analyse the problem of coexistence and then uses a 
Monte Carlo simulation to assess the nature of the 
externality associated with pollen-mediated gene 
flow.  
The analytical model draws on the theory of 
production externalities and provides a number of 
stylised results. First, in the 'laissez-faire' regime 
GM farmers will adopt no measures to reduce  
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contamination of conventional farmers. 
Conventional growers, as recipient of the 
externality, will protect themselves by adopting 
buffers on the edges of their conventional fields 
neighbouring GM fields and will tend to cluster 
away from GM fields. This result is consistent with 
the existence of spatial externalities [19]. The 
maximization of joint profits (i.e. the social 
optimum) requires GM farmers to reduce their GM 
plantings, adopt some buffers and invest some 
resources in clustering. Also notice that when GM 
buffers are in place, conventional farmers planting 
decisions and clustering efforts have an effect on 
GM farmers. This aspect should be considered when 
designing coexistence policies. In general the 
prescription of mandatory buffers on GM fields so 
as to eliminate the externality is economically 
inefficient since it might excessively reduce the GM 
adoption and might eliminate any incentive of the 
conventional farmers to self-protect. In general, 
policy interventions to achieve the social optimum 
should include:  
 
1.  A levy on GM land allocation to account for 
the effects of GM farmers planting decisions on 
the contamination cost and on the cost of 
conventional buffers. If the marginal effect of 
GM farmers planting decisions on the 
magnitude of conventional farmers' buffers is 
small, the value of the levy will be close to the 
value of the marginal contamination cost. 
2.  A moderate mandatory buffer on GM fields to 
account for the benefits to conventional farmers 
in terms of reduction of the contamination cost.  
3.  A smaller levy on conventional OSR land 
allocation to account for the effect of 
conventional farmers planting decisions on the 
cost of GM buffers. If the effect of 
conventional farmers planting decisions on the 
magnitude of the GM buffer is small, the value 
of the levy will be close to zero. 
4.  Incentives for both conventional and GM 
farmers to increase clustering, to account for 
the 'public' benefits of spatial aggregation.  
 
The last point is particularly interesting. Since the 
extent of contamination is decreasing in the degree 
of spatial aggregation, the regulator could propose 
lower levies rates and lower mandatory GM buffers 
width when higher degrees of clustering are 
achieved. Experimental results suggest that 
economic incentives can be quite effective at 
increasing spatial aggregation of different land uses 
[30]. 
Over the past years, considerable effort has been 
devoted to the study of the implications of pollen-
mediated gene flow for coexistence for a number of 
crops, including OSR (e.g. [31], [20] and [23] and 
[24]). The Monte Carlo experiment in this paper is 
innovative in different respects. First, it looks at the 
implications of pollen-mediate gene flow on the 
externality to conventional growers at the landscape 
level with particular attention to the role of the 
relative area of GM and conventional crops, buffers 
width and spatial aggregation. Second, by analysing 
the effect of buffer areas on both GM and 
conventional fields the paper provides useful 
information on the relative effectiveness of these 
measures. Our results cannot be immediately 
generalised, since they depend on the parameter 
values and the IDF chosen in our experiment. For 
example, using a different IDF with a 'fatter tail' (i.e. 
higher level of gene flow at longer distances as in 
[17]), could make spatial aggregation less important. 
Increasing field size would probably reduce the 
extent of contamination. [32] record AP levels at 
field scale below 0.03% in Australia, where field 
size varies between 25 and 100 ha. Despite these 
limits, our results are still relevant for coexistence 
policies. As already mentioned the current focus of 
coexistence policies is on the establishment of 
mandatory buffers on GM fields so as to drive 
contamination to zero. Our experiment's results 
suggest that conventional buffers are always more 
effective than GM buffers. We have already pointed 
out how establishment of mandatory buffers on GM 
fields so as to achieve zero contamination is 
economically inefficient. This argument is made 
stronger by the fact that buffers on GM fields are 
also 'technically' less efficient than buffers on 
conventional fields. If the difference in the buffer 
cost for GM and conventional farmers is not too big 
(i.e. if the premium ∆p is not too high), than even at 
the social optimum it might be preferable to have 
conventional farmers to adopt larger buffers than 
GM farmers. The Monte Carlo experiment also 
suggests that the degree of spatial aggregation is the 
element with the largest ME on the contamination 
externality. However, the extent to which increases 
in coordination effort (necessaries to increase spatial 
aggregation) should be pursued will clearly depend 
on the costs of coordination. It is then obvious that  
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any step that could lower the costs of coordination is 
likely to be very important for coexistence. Given 
the large number of farmers that could be involved 
in coordination of planting decisions, the best way 
to reduce coordination costs could be to work at a 
more centralised level (e.g. through regional farmers 
associations). This is quite a common practice in 
certified seed production (e.g. maize seed 
production in France), where the need to avoid 
cross-pollination is of paramount importance. The 
identification of the specific policies for coexistence 
is beyond the remit of this paper and would have to 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis. The practical 
management issue for coexistence in the EU is to 
determine the relative pay-off to the different 
strategies to abate the externality (e.g. reducing the 
GM area through a levy, mandatory buffers, 
increasing spatial aggregation) for farming systems 
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